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BAOGANG HE
A Deliberative Approach to the Tibet Autonomy Issue
Promoting Mutual Trust through Dialogue
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews and compares three deliberative approaches to conflict, and ap-
plies the deliberative approach to the Tibet issue. It examines the case of a delibera-
tive workshop, its achievements and limits. Deliberative dialogue appears to have 
improved knowledge and mutual understanding, enhanced mutual trust and delib-
erative capacities, and produced moderating effects. 
KEYWORDS :  deliberative democracy, deliberative approach, dialogue, conflict 
resolution, Tibet issue 
The theory and practice of deliberative democracy was first developed 
in Western societies in the political science disciplines in the 1990s.1 In the 
past decade, it spread to Asia and even to China.2 Deliberative democracy 
prioritizes reasoned argument and discussion in which “interests” are recog-
nized but do not dominate. The cogency and force of argument should prevail 
over political power. Communications work to ensure that arguments and 
statements are factually true, normatively right, and expressively sincere.3 
Baogang He is chair of the International Studies Department at Deakin University, Melbourne, 
Victoria, Australia. Recently, he has made a ground-breaking study of deliberative politics in China. 
The author would like to thank John Dryzek and Colin Mackerras for their valuable comments; 
Eilidh St. John, Ned Dobos, Shupin Mei, and Wei Su for their assistance; the Australian Research 
Council (ARC) for grants (DP0666271 and DP0986641); and the anonymous reviewers for their 
critical comments and suggestions. Email: <baogang.he@deakin.edu.au>.
1. See Joshua Cohen, “Deliberative Democracy and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity, 
eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17–34; John Dryzek, Deliberative 
Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jon 
Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
2. Ethan Leib and Baogang He, eds., The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China (New York: 
Palgrave, 2006).
3. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
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Deliberation examines the merit of an argument and evidence at a reflective 
and rational level, leading to changes in opinion and policy attitude. Delib-
eration requires that reason and truth predominate, and emotion, bias, and 
social prejudice must give way to reason and substantive argument. The de-
liberative capacity can be measured by the existence and development of 
diverse views, the willingness to change one’s view, and the respect for reason 
and the production of the best argument. 
Deliberative democratic theorists also stress the capacity, right, and op-
portunity of ordinary citizens to participate in public deliberation. The de-
veloped and varied forums of public deliberation include citizen juries, focus 
groups, consensus conferences, deliberative polling, and town meetings.4 
The deliberative approach to national identity conflicts has been intro-
duced and examined by O’Flynn, Dryzek, Fishkin, and others, as will be 
discussed later. It has been seen as an effective means of enhancing mutual 
understanding and trust, and building friendship between and across ethnic 
groups.5 Scholars differ, however, in their evaluation of the effects of delib-
eration. Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that deliberation will lead to 
polarization.6 Others doubt the value of deliberative democracy in conflict 
situations, and some even claim that deliberation can contain a bias against 
minorities and women, although there is actually little evidence of this.7 
Although the deliberative approach is currently favored in conflict resolution 
studies, it is completely foreign to many scholars and no doubt will be regarded 
by some with intense suspicion. Nevertheless, the deliberative approach has 
been applied to the national identity conflict issue in China in recent years.8 
The application is innovative in that it attempts to change the Chinese political 
culture by developing the deliberative forum in a civil society context.9
4. Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Em-
powered Participatory Governance (London: Verso, 2003).
5. James Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 6.
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, “Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes,” Yale Law Journal 
110:1 (October 2000), pp. 71–119; and idem, “The Law of Group Polarization,” in Debating Delib-
erative Democracy, eds. James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
7. David Miller, “Is Deliberative Democracy Unfair to Disadvantaged Groups?” in Maurizio 
Passerin d’Entrèves, ed., Democracy as Public Deliberation (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2006), pp. 201–25.
8. See Baogang He, Deliberative Democracy: Theory, Method, and Practice (Beijing: China’s Social 
Science Publishers, 2008), ch. 4, on the deliberative democracy and national identity question. 
9. Baogang He, “Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia,” 
Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 10:2 (May 2004), 
pp. 227–46; Leib and He, The Search for Deliberative Democracy, chs. 1, 4, 6.
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In collaboration with Alex Butler and Simon Bradshaw, Baogang He or-
ganized a three day deliberative workshop in late November 2008 in Mel-
bourne, Australia. This was a pilot deliberative forum on the Tibetan au-
tonomy question, Sino-Tibet relations, and the disputed history of Tibet. 
The academic aims of the workshop were to test whether deliberation pro-
motes mutual understanding, leads to value change, polarizes the partici-
pants, or produces moderating effects. Its practical purposes were to promote 
greater mutual understanding and tolerance between ethnic-Chinese and 
Tibetan groups, and to enhance the deliberative capacities of both ethnic-
Chinese and Tibetan students.
The deliberative workshop had mixed results. The recruitment of partici-
pants was difficult and therefore disappointing, and the value question re-
mains unchanged. The small sample size in this study means that the results 
are best considered as indicative and may therefore act as pointers for further 
confirmatory work. Nevertheless, the experiment validated two claims. First, 
a citizen-initiated deliberative forum moves away from, and is more effective 
than, those of state institutions in terms of creating a public space, challenging 
narrow official lines of thinking, and moderately changing people’s opinions. 
Second, a deliberative forum is able to reduce the level of mutual distrust and 
build up mutual understanding and trust despite its inherent limits. 
This paper examines the achievement and limits of this innovative delib-
eration. The structure of the paper is as follows. It first introduces and re-
views the various deliberative approaches to conflict. Then it examines the 
reasons and background for applying the deliberative approach to the Tibet 
issue, followed by a discussion of the design of a deliberative forum on the 
Tibet autonomy question. The results of the deliberative forum are examined 
in detail in the last two sections.
DELIBERATIvE APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS
The deliberative approach can be seen as a form of Interactive Conflict Reso-
lution (ICR). ICR involves problem-solving discussions between unofficial 
representatives of groups or states engaged in protracted violent conflict. The 
objective is to re-humanize the enemy, foster positive attitudes, and create 
agreement on the source and nature of the conflict.10 Fisher explains that 
10. Ronald J. Fisher, “Interactive Conflict Resolution,” in I. William Zartman, ed., Peacemaking 
in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of 
Peace, 2007), p. 227. 
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“the rationale is to provide an informal, low risk, noncommittal, and neutral 
forum in which unofficial representatives of the parties may engage in ex-
ploratory analysis and creative problem solving, free from the usual con-
straints of official policy and public scrutiny.”11
ICR might include highly influential representatives from the conflicting 
groups, ordinary members, and also representatives of the diaspora commu-
nities.12 In some cases, the aim of ICR is primarily educational: to provide 
insights and change perceptions. But in other cases, the aim is to transfer the 
solutions suggested in the informal interactions to official decision-making 
bodies via the influential participants. ICR workshops can also indirectly 
contribute to an official solution by “legitimizing problem-solving interac-
tions between adversaries and the accumulation of public opinion support-
ing negotiation.”13 Furthermore, “grassroots reconciliatory dialogue across 
adversarial lines can . . . help counteract the influence of pressure groups 
working to block conciliatory policies.”14 
The deliberative approach can be further broken down into the following 
three models: two normative principles, discourse in the public sphere, and 
the designed forums, detailed below. These are simply the models that can 
be derived from the available literature and should by no means be treated 
as exhaustive. 
Two Normative Principles
Following John Stuart Mill, Ian O’Flynn is adamant that a stable democracy 
cannot exist without a sense of common identity. He builds his argument 
around two key norms of deliberative democracy: reciprocity and publicity. 
The requirement of reciprocity states that, in seeking to justify proposals, 
citizens must appeal to reasons that all parties to the discussion can appreciate, 
not to reasons reducible to the interests of one ethnic group. By publicity, 
O’Flynn means that the process by which representatives arrive at decisions 
should be open and transparent. He claims that a proper respect for these 
norms can help the citizens of divided societies develop and sustain a stron-
ger sense of common identity, without discarding their ethnic affiliations.15
11. Ibid., pp. 229–30. 
12. Ibid., p. 242. 
13. Ibid., p. 261. 
14. Ibid., p. 243. 
15. Ian O’Flynn, Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006). 
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O’Flynn also stresses the importance of fostering a strong civil society in 
which individuals can engage each other in non-ethnic terms, and which 
allows space for the emergence of identities that cut across ethnic lines. It is 
essential to allow alternative forms of political engagement and expression, 
or reasoned political argument. A common objection to the deliberative 
model of democracy is that those without a sophisticated political vocabu-
lary are at an inherent disadvantage. They are unlikely to prevail over their 
more articulate counterparts, no matter the strength of their case. This defi-
ciency can be partly addressed, says O’Flynn, by allowing narratives and 
personal stories to be included in deliberations.16 
Discourse in the Public Sphere
The public sphere, the conditionality of sovereignty, and the transnational-
ization of political discourse feature prominently in John S. Dryzek’s version 
of deliberative democracy in divided societies.17 Dryzek argues that contend-
ing discourses (sets of concepts, categories, and ideas that provide ways of 
understanding the world) underlie many of the world’s conflicts. These dis-
courses can, however, open the way to greater dialogue across state boundaries 
and between opposing factions in societies divided by ethnicity, nationality, or 
religion. The argument is that engagement among discourses that is not 
geared toward building sovereign authority or making political decisions can 
help to resolve many of the most intractable conflicts. 
Dryzek’s aim is to determine how deliberative procedures can yield results 
on contentious issues where the fundamental values and beliefs that partici-
pants bring to the table are diametrically opposed or contradictory. Dryzek 
offers a number of recommendations for deliberative democracy in divided 
societies. 
Firstly, deliberation should be focused not on values or ideals but on spe-
cific needs—such as the need for education or for adequate sustenance. Since 
such needs can be appreciated by all parties to the deliberation, focusing the 
discussion on them will make divisions seem less intractable. Secondly, there 
should be periods of “small talk” that are not geared toward resolving any 
16. A lot of work on this issue has been done by feminist theorists who argue that the exclusion 
of “anecdotal” argument from academic discourse has been a way of excluding women’s experience. 
See Kate Millett, Sexual Politics: A Manifesto for Revolution (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2000). 
17. John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 154–57. 
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issues at all. Dryzek makes this recommendation on the basis of research 
showing that periods of “irrelevant discussion” can help to foster subsequent 
cooperative behavior. 
Third, Dryzek argues that deliberation should not necessarily occur pri-
marily within the existing institutions of the nation state, and should not be 
directly connected to political decisions, especially not those regarding sov-
ereign authority. Dryzek maintains that people involved in deliberative pro-
cedures are unlikely to change their minds or to admit that they have 
changed their minds, where the deliberation is intended to produce a politi-
cal decision—particularly one that has some bearing on who controls the 
state and its resources. The “deadly contest for sovereignty” inhibits people 
from opposing factions from making concessions. Furthermore, individuals 
are typically reluctant to admit that they have changed their minds “under 
the gaze of both opponents and those with a shared identity.” Personal pride 
and credibility play an important role here. 
For these reasons, Dryzek recommends that deliberations should occur 
within an “informal communicative realm” that takes place over time, such 
as a public network, deliberative poll, or policy dialogue. This would afford 
participants the opportunity to admit having been persuaded by the other 
side. If the deliberations are not directly linked to political decisions, the 
contest for power is less likely to prevent people from openly changing their 
minds. 
Designed Forums
James Fishkin and his colleagues have developed an experimental study on 
the effectiveness of grassroots deliberation in managing and de-escalating 
identity conflicts. In 2007, Fishkin organized a “deliberative poll” in Omagh, 
Northern Ireland. One hundred and twenty-seven Protestants and Catholics 
were asked to answer a series of questions relating to children’s education 
policy in the region. After the poll, the participants were invited to deliberate 
in small-group discussions and plenary sessions. The original questionnaire 
was then put before the participants once more. The results indicated that 
the perceptions of the participants changed significantly in the course of the 
dialogue. The proportion of Catholics who believed Protestants were “open 
to reason” increased from 36% to 52%, while the proportion of Protestants 
believing that Catholics were “open to reason” increased from 40% to 56%. 
There was also a dramatic increase in the proportion of each community that 
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viewed the other as “trustworthy.” For Catholics, the proportion rose from 
50% to 62%, and for Protestants it rose from 50% to 60%. The experiment 
suggests that citizens are open to rational discussion and willing to change 
their opinions, and that deliberation can enhance mutual trust in divided 
societies.18 
Comparing Three Approaches
O’Flynn’s model is characterized by its emphasis on principles of reciprocity 
and publicity. For O’Flynn, deliberations should take place between elite 
representatives as well as ordinary citizens. The aims of deliberation should 
engage major political issues, create an overarching civic identity, and resolve 
seemingly intractable political problems. Dryzek, by contrast, situates delib-
eration entirely in the public sphere, and insists that deliberation should be 
“semi-detached” from the state, focusing on specific needs, not issues of 
sovereignty and constitutional essentials. The aim is to create shared dis-
courses in divided societies. The designed forums developed by Fishkin simi-
larly sees deliberation taking place at the grassroots level, but in a controlled 
setting where all the relevant information for decision-making is provided 
and there is input from experts and facilitators. One would think that to 
have any noticeable impact, such experiments would need to be replicated 
on a large scale.
The three models offer different accounts of how deliberation is supposed 
to confer legitimacy upon the solutions. For O’Flynn, legitimacy is achieved 
by the satisfaction of reciprocity and publicity. These principles ensure that 
the solutions reached take account of the interests of all involved and treat 
persons as equals. According to Dryzek, a resolution is legitimate if it can be 
justified in terms of a shared discourse that has arisen through public-sphere 
deliberation, including a plurality of voices. Meanwhile, for Fishkin, a reso-
lution is legitimate if it is reached by participants who have been given all of 
the relevant information and the opportunity to deliberate.
The three approaches aim at different but related outcomes. O’Flynn’s 
model aims to treat all participants as equals and does not marginalize ex-
tremist elements. As a result, the outcome is more likely to be accepted by 
all involved, and the prospect of a backlash from extremist groups is mini-
mized. For Dryzek, informal deliberation in the public sphere is supposed to 
18. Fishkin, When the People Speak.
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create a new discourse. In the long term, this new discourse infiltrates the 
political sphere and influences official decision-making. For Fishkin, the aim 
of deliberation is to build tolerance and trust by breaking down stereotypes 
and negative attitudes, and to re-humanize the Other. 
The three models differ in their methods of enhancing the deliberative 
capacities of citizens. Fishkin’s approach seems to be strongest in this regard, 
insofar as participants in his experimental deliberative polls are provided 
with all of the relevant information and there is input from experts and fa-
cilitators. O’Flynn, by contrast, does not provide mechanisms for enhancing 
the deliberative capacities of citizens. Those citizens with limited deliberative 
capacities are simply encouraged to rely on narratives rather than on rea-
soned argument. Having said this, O’Flynn’s publicity principle does ensure 
that citizens are given an insight into the reasoning employed by representa-
tives in their decision-making. In a similar vein, Dryzek focuses on specific 
needs rather than issues of sovereignty and constitutional essentials; this ar-
guably makes the deliberative process more accessible to ordinary citizens. 
Regarding the degree of interaction required, O’Flynn stresses that within 
civil society, high levels of interaction are needed to create overarching civic 
identity. The interaction between civil society and the state is ensured via the 
principle of publicity. By contrast, Dryzek emphasizes extensive interaction 
within civil society but only a “loose” connection between the state and the 
public sphere, where the former is “semi-detached” from the latter. Fishkin 
limits deliberation to isolated experiments involving a relatively small sample 
of participants. 
The empirical testability of the three approaches varies. It is difficult to see 
how O’Flynn’s proposal might be tested for effectiveness. And in relation to 
Dryzek’s model, determining whether a public discourse has changed the 
public consciousness and infiltrated the political realm is no easy feat. Only 
Fishkin’s approach seems to be empirically testable: the impact of delibera-
tion is rigidly tested through pre- and post-deliberation polling, and the re-
sults are quantifiable. 
The effectiveness of the three deliberative models is subject to interpreta-
tion. According to Dryzek, the Canadian experience demonstrates that when 
deliberation is focused on sovereignty and the Constitution, the likely out-
come is “deadlock, frustration, and failure.”19 But public-sphere informal 
19. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies: Alternatives to Agonism and Anal-
gesia,” Political Theory 33:2 (April 2005), p. 235.
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deliberation has helped make Canada “such a generally successful society.”20 
Alain Noel, however, points out that the “deepening of democracy” in 
Canada—the greater inclusion of the masses in the political process—has 
led to an impasse. Ajzenstat and Cook further argue that public participation 
has worsened the divisions in Canadian society.21 
Take another example: Northern Ireland. Dryzek lists the case of North-
ern Ireland in the 1990s among his “three kinds of failure.”22 He says that the 
relationship between the public and political sphere is too “tight.” Those 
involved in the public deliberation had close links to the political leadership 
on both sides. Deliberation thus tended to degenerate into a “contest over 
sovereign authority.” By contrast, Sean Byrne seems to think that the public 
deliberation in Northern Ireland has been quite successful. The interactions 
among local historical societies and churches/clergymen have created forums 
for joint problem solving in and between local neighborhoods.23 
WHY PROPOSE A DELIBERATIvE APPROACH FOR THE TIBET ISSuE?
Push the Questions Farther
The deliberative workshop on the Tibet issue built upon and extended the 
above studies to explore whether deliberation can deal with the problem of 
Tibetan autonomy. The workshop put Dryzek’s proposal into practice. The 
participants were asked to critically reflect on the two competing official 
discourses on the Tibet issue, that of the Chinese government and that of the 
Tibetan government-in-exile (TGIE). Alternative views and approaches were 
to be explored. The workshop attempted to democratize the state’s discourses 
on the Tibet issue and to create a considered public sphere in which ethnic 
Chinese and Tibetans could engage in rational discussion.
O’Flynn’s two principles of publicity and reciprocity are purely theoretical 
and need to be put into practice. The workshop was intended to involve real 
people in the real world, allowing them to engage in real dialogue. Fishkin’s 
experimental study was limited in that it dealt with easy issues like education 
20. Ibid., pp. 235–36. 
21. Janet Ajzenstat and Curtis Cook, “Constitution Making and the Myth of the People,” in 
Constitutional Predicament: Canada after the Referendum of 1992, ed. Curtis Cook (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), pp. 112–26. 
22. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies,” p. 237. 
23. Sean Byrne, “Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern 
Ireland,” Journal of Peace Research 38:3 (May 2001), p. 339. 
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policy. One could argue that when it comes to the most difficult issues like 
autonomy, deliberation alone cannot solve the problem. Our deliberative 
workshop put this argument to the test. We focused on a number of tough 
political questions regarding the issue of Tibetan autonomy and examined 
whether deliberation enhances mutual understanding and trust. Would the 
participants change their value position in the course of deliberative process? 
Would reason prevail, and if so, how?
Search for an Alternative to Overcome the Current Stalemate
The Tibet issue has remained intractable for at least 50 years.24 Several dia-
logues between representatives of the exiled Dalai Lama and the Chinese 
government in the past few years have produced no tangible results.25 The 
2008 Tibetan protests against Chinese rule in the run-up to the Beijing 
Olympics,26 and the counter-protests by Chinese students in major cities 
around the world, inflamed mistrust and suspicion between the Tibetan and 
ethnic Chinese communities. This discord tarnished China’s credibility as a 
global power.27 Over the next few years, increased radicalization in both 
Tibetan and ethnic Chinese communities is anticipated. This highlights the 
need for initiatives that would build up mutual understanding and trust at a 
grassroots level, as well as within the leaderships. Given how hard it is now 
to rebuild trust between the Chinese government and the TGIE, it is vital to 
promote mutual understanding and trust between the two communities of 
people through citizens’ deliberation.
Policy-oriented studies on Tibet have been informed by two mainstream 
paradigms: realism and human rights discourse.28 The politics of Tibet has 
24. Elliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics (Washington, D.C.: East-West 
Center, 2004); Barry Sautman and June Dreyer, eds., Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and 
Society in a Disputed Region (Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2006).
25. D. S. Rajan, “Beijing and the Dalai Lama: Ice Melting?” South Asia Analysis Group, New 
Delhi, no. 1271 (February 28, 2005); “Talks Progressing, Says Tibet’s PM-in-Exile,” The Nation 
[Bangkok], March 14, 2005; Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue 
in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects,” Policy Studies 12 (Washington, D.C.: East West 
Center, 2004).
26. For a historical explanation of the Tibetan protests, see Tsering Shakya, “Tibetan Questions,” 
New Left Review 51 (May-June 2008), p. 5. 
27. Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal, “China’s Olympic Nightmare: What the Games 
Mean for Beijing’s Future,” Foreign Affairs 87:4 (July-August 2008), p. 47. 
28. Of course, scholars employ other theoretical approaches found in feminism, sociology, and 
cultural studies. For example, Lauran R. Hartley, “On the Margins of Tibet: Cultural Survival on 
AS5004_04_He.indd   718 8/19/10   2:08 PM
HE /  T IBET AuTONOMY APPROACH • 719
been analyzed through an examination of the political relations among 
major powers.29 The Dalai Lama’s policies and strategies have been adapted 
to shifting international power relations,30 while Beijing’s Tibet policy is cer-
tainly based on its constant assessment of and adjustment to great-power 
relations.31 Despite the recommendation by many that its officials should 
talk to the Dalai Lama directly,32 Beijing has adopted an ever tougher policy. 
Its intention appears to be isolating and silencing the Dalai Lama com-
pletely: time is on Beijing’s side as China rises and the Dalai Lama ages.
In recent years, Chinese authorities have acquired a stronger power base 
both politically and diplomatically in the Himalayan region.33 Beijing’s real-
ist policy toward the Dalai Lama is best summarized by an official on the 
Nationalities Affairs Committee of the State Council: “Qiangqi (capture the 
moral high ground), suozhu (lock in), and tuokua (wear down).”34 This kind 
of realism leads to dirty politics, perpetuates the Tibet problem, leaves nor-
mative issues out, and fails to provide any moral ground for China’s Tibet 
policy. 
The discourse of human rights, however, is eager to engage normative is-
sues and criticizes Chinese policies on Tibet from a moral high ground. In 
the Sino-Tibetan Frontier,” History of Religions 48:1 (2008), pp. 77–79; Charlene E. Makley, “Gen-
dered Boundaries in Motion: Space and Identity on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier,” American Ethnolo-
gist 30:4 (November 2003), pp. 597–619; Ashild Kolas, “‘Class’ in Tibet: Creating Social Order be-
fore and during the Mao Era,” Identities––Global Studies in Culture and Power 10:2 (April 2003), pp. 
181–200. 
29. See Bryan J. Cuevas and Kurtis R. Schaeffer, eds., Power, Politics, and the Reinvention of 
Tradition: Tibet in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, vol. 3, Proceedings of the 10th Seminar 
of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Oxford (2003); Melvyn C. Goldstein, “Tibet, 
China, and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question,” Occasional Paper, Atlantic Coun-
cil of the United States (April 1995); and Dibyesh Anand, “Strategic Hypocrisy: The British Imperial 
Scripting of Tibet’s Geopolitical Identity,” Journal of Asian Studies 68:1 (February 2009), pp. 227–52.
30. For detailed controversial studies of the topic, see Baogang He and Barry Sautman, “The 
Politics of the Dalai Lama’s New Initiative for Autonomy,” Pacific Affairs 78:4 (Winter 2005–2006), 
pp. 601–29; and Laurence Brahm, “Conciliatory Dalai Lama Expounds on Winds of Change,” 
South China Morning Post (SCMP), March 14, 2005, A4.
31. Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2002). 
32. Robert Thurman, Why the Dalai Lama Matters: His Act of Truth as the Solution for China, 
Tibet, and the World (New York: Atria Book, 2008); Orville Schell, “Chinese Puzzle––Why Won’t 
Beijing Make Peace with the Dalai Lama?” San Francisco Chronicle, June 24, 2001; and John K. 
Knaus, “China’s Opportunity to Resolve Tibet Issue,” Boston Globe, December 8, 2003, p. A13.
33. Thierry Mathou, “Tibet and Its Neighbors––Moving toward a New Chinese Strategy in the 
Himalayan Region,” Asian Survey 45:4 (July/August 2005), pp. 503–21. 
34. Jing Huang, “The Tibet Issue: An Impasse or Entrapment?” paper presented at the Round-
table on the Tibet Issue, University of Hong Kong, July 29–30, 2009.
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1959, the U.S. counseled Tibetan exiles that they could get more political 
mileage by emphasizing human rights rather than sovereignty.35 This had 
rather little impact at the time. Since 1987 the use of human rights language 
has been actively advocated and accepted by a number of international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Nowadays, discussion on the Tibet 
issue in the West is predominantly framed by human rights. Michael Davis, 
for example, drew on the new U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in recommending a change in China’s policy toward Tibet by estab-
lishing a more genuine system of autonomy there.36 To argue that the source 
of the Tibet issue is a failure to protect human rights is a kind of normative 
thinking that transforms complex Tibetan issues into human rights issues. 
Often it plays up moral issues, overlooks the complexity of politics, and of-
fers little in the way of realistic policy alternatives.37 
Over the past decade, realism and human rights discourses have consti-
tuted two closed knowledge systems. Recycling its own ideas, each side has 
engendered paradigms, predetermining opinion and rationality. Although 
realism regards the human rights language as a disguised attempt to disrupt 
Chinese unity and order, human rights discourse dismisses Chinese realist 
thinking as an attempt to demand surrender to the authoritarianism of 
China. Both theories strengthen polarization, leaving little room to build 
up mutual trust. It is important to develop a deliberative forum to break 
down self-closed knowledge production systems and find a way out of the 
predicament. 
Improving Current Dialogues through Social Science-based 
Public Deliberation
A deliberative approach to minority rights issues in Xinjiang Province was 
called for by Justin J. Stein, who argues that “CCP [Chinese Communist 
Party] rhetoric regarding the unity and apparently utopian quality of interac-
tions between various nationalities should be replaced by a more genuine 
35. John B. Roberts, “The Secret War over Tibet,” American Spectator 30:12 (1997), p. 34.
36. Michael Davis, “Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet,” Human Rights Quarterly 30:2 
(2008), pp. 227–58; also see Tibetan Commission on Human Rights and Development (TCHRD), 
Impoverishing Tibetans: China’s Flawed Economic Policy in Tibet (Dharamsala: TCHRD, 2000); 
Pierre Hassner, “Rights of Man, Nationalism, and Balances of Power: Chechnya, Kosovo, Tibet,” 
Espirit, no. 5 (2008), pp. 24–28.
37. Also see Baogang He, “Minority Rights with Chinese Characteristics,” in Multiculturalism 
in Asia, eds. Will Kymlicka and Baogang He (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 56–79.
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discourse reflective of vying interests and preferences.”38 In the past decade, 
the Dalai Lama himself has made a number of significant efforts to talk with 
Han Chinese scholars in the U.S. and beyond.39 Even earlier, in 1988, Wu 
Jinghua, the former party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
organized a series of “heart to heart” meetings with representatives of the 
major monasteries to hear their grievances. Wu paid a price, becoming 
dubbed a “Lama Secretary”40 and being removed from his position a few 
months later.
In 2009 and 2010, Beijing sent a number of official delegations to major 
international cities to host a series of talks on China’s Tibet policy. (A quick 
online search for the term “Sino-Tibetan dialogue” on March 20, 2009, 
brought up a list of 24,700 items.) Such meetings could potentially reduce 
mutual distrust, explore new thinking and initiatives, and provide a basis for 
the development of a deliberative approach. Nevertheless, most of the dia-
logues ended in rhetorical stalemate.41 Some were designed to promote and 
reinforce the fixed view of one side.42 Others remained consultative and were 
oriented toward elites rather than citizens. 
The limitations of elite dialogue give rise to a need for public deliberation 
in which critical intellectuals and scholars, ordinary citizens, and students 
can consider and perhaps change their views and follow reason-based argu-
ment. Elsewhere, I have examined the extent to which some dialogues are 
deliberative.43 Here, I stress that dialogue can and should be made delibera-
tive through well-designed public discussion, as developed below. 
DESIGN AND SAMPLING OF THE DELIBERATIvE EXPERIMENT
A public deliberation that meets the requirements of deliberative democracy 
must be well designed to ensure that it fulfills the principles of representa-
tion, openness, transparency, equality, and fairness. 
38. Justin J. Stein, “Taking the Deliberative Turn in China: International Law, Minority Rights, 
and the Case of Xinjiang,” Journal of Public and International Affairs 14 (2003).
39. Zhang Weiguo, ed., Icebreaking: Dialogue with the Dalai Lama (Washington, D.C.: Founda-
tion for China in the 21st Century, 1999). 
40. S. K Bahl, “China’s Failure in Tibet: Pulls and Pressures in Domestic Politics,” China Report 
25:3 (1989), p. 286. 
41. Rabgey and Sharlho, “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue.” 
42. This is the personal experience of this author from several workshops and conferences.
43. Baogang He and David Hundt, “A Deliberative Approach to Northeast Asia’s Contested His-
tory,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Boston, Mass., 2008.
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To ensure equitable representation, random selection is the best method. 
Originally, I thought this could be done easily, given the vast number of 
Chinese students in Australian universities. It soon turned out to be imprac-
tical and disappointing. Around major cities in the world including Can-
berra, thousands of Chinese students participated in what they regarded as 
the patriotic cause of defending China against the Dalai Lama and his sup-
porters in March and April 2008. But when they were offered an opportu-
nity to explore the reasons why Tibetans protested against Beijing Olympic 
Games and to participate in finding a solution to the Tibet problem, they 
showed indifference. This indifference can be explained in a number of ways. 
It might have been because of the mutual suspicion that built up around the 
conflicts during the Olympic Torch relay. Fear of consequences for partici-
pating in the project, which might occur when they returned to China, also 
played a part. So did political propaganda casting the Dalai Lama as an 
“enemy” and the Chinese political culture, which tells students not to discuss 
sensitive issues like Tibet during their time abroad. The indifference from 
many Chinese students gives rise to a worrying concern that Chinese stu-
dents are more or less emotional but non-rational nationalists.
After the impossibility of random selection became clear, I called for vol-
unteers and was able to find 14 Tibetan students and 12 ethnic Chinese stu-
dents who came from major universities in Australia. These included the 
Australian National University, University of Adelaide, University of Sydney, 
University of Technology of Sydney, Monash University, and the Royal Mel-
bourne Institute of Technology (RMIT). All were aged between 19 and 33, 
with the average age being 27. The demographic information about the par-
ticipants is provided in Table 1 (from Survey Questions [Q] 1–6). 
A few of the Chinese participants have lived in minority areas, and one or 
two could speak a little bit of Tibetan. Six Tibetans were recently arrived, 
young exiles from Tibetan areas of China, while three were born of mixed 
marriages of Tibetan and Australian parents. This explains why most of the 
Tibetan participants were able to speak Chinese at the level of basic conver-
sation. It was interesting to observe that most of the volunteer Chinese par-
ticipants showed a great interest in developing their knowledge. The survey 
result showed that they made more changes in their opinions than their 
Tibetan counterparts. By contrast, the newly exiled Tibetans tended to want 
to “teach Chinese [persons] about the real situation”; they were more radical 
in demanding complete independence than other Tibetans. Interestingly, the 
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three second-generation Tibetan exiles from the mixed marriages were more 
moderate and tended to change their opinions based on rational judgment. 
Nevertheless, they shared with the rest of the Tibetans the aspiration for the 
preservation and development of Tibetan culture. Certainly, there appeared 
to be two different levels of knowledge, language, and experience in the 
Tibetan group. But given the anonymity of the data, it is impossible to 
disaggregate the data to isolate and reflect upon the differences between 
second-generation Tibetans and China-educated Tibetans. 
To ensure frank deliberation, anonymity was guaranteed. Most Chinese 
participants are going back to China (three had returned by the time of writ-
ing). In order to ensure that the Chinese (as well Tibetan) students could 
speak out freely without fear of political risk, all their names were kept pri-
vate, and they filled out the survey questionnaire anonymously. 
To ensure high quality deliberation, it is necessary to give participants as 
much information as possible. All participants were provided with a 275-
page reading packet a month prior to the workshop and encouraged to read 
as much of the material as possible before their arrival. The packet contained 
a mixture of 16 scholarly articles, official government documents, and news-
paper stories—an equal number from both Tibetan and Chinese sources. 
The items were carefully selected by the organizers to provide participants 
with detailed and balanced perspectives on the Tibet issue.






















Q3 Visited Tibetan area before   0 46
Q4 Visited Han Chinese area before 100 23
Q5 Speak Mandarin 100 92
Q6 Speak Tibetan   8 69
source: By author.
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To meet the fairness and equality principles, two facilitators were chosen, 
Baogang He, who has a Chinese background, and Lobsang Sangay, who has 
a Tibetan background. They were not to put forward their own ideas but 
were to make sure that all participants had equal time to speak and to pre-
vent domination by one or two persons. They were required to lead the 
participants to appreciate the perspectives of others, give reasons in good 
faith, and implement the following rules: “listen to others carefully”; “don’t 
interrupt when others are speaking”; “everyone has a chance to talk and must 
express his/her view sincerely”; “be fully committed to rational discussion 
and avoid an emotional attack on others”; and “try to give concrete examples 
and evidence.” Most times, the two facilitators maintained neutrality in lead-
ing the discussions and presenting both sides of the argument, which the 
survey results confirm. Occasionally, however, one facilitator did put forward 
his own view, which may have affected the process. 
In order to identify and measure whether the participants changed their 
opinions, two surveys were carried out. Before the deliberation, the partici-
pants were asked to complete a questionnaire to record their opinions and 
positions on a number of issues. After the deliberation, the participants were 
asked to complete the same questionnaire once more and to answer a few 
new questions about the process of deliberation. 
The deliberative workshop began with a general introduction by Professor 
Baogang He, followed by an address by Professor Damien Kingsbury, who 
talked about how Indonesia managed the issues of East Timor and Aceh. 
Then the participants were divided into two groups, each made up of half 
Tibetans and half ethnic Chinese. The two facilitators led the groups through 
a series of sessions designed to give the participants greater knowledge and 
understanding of each other, their personal and family backgrounds, and the 
historical events and leaders who have shaped those backgrounds. 
The first day focused on Tibetan and ethnic Chinese perspectives on the 
Tibet situation. The uses and limitations of history in resolving conflict 
and the myth of objective historical “truth” were examined. The second 
day focused on the Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way” policy. The workshop con-
cluded with an intellectual exercise in which Tibetan students were asked 
to imagine what they would recommend to Chinese President Hu Jintao 
on handling the Tibet issue, if they were his policy advisers. Ethnic Chi-
nese participants, on the other hand, were required to consider how they 
would act if they were policy advisers to the Dalai Lama. This exercise was 
AS5004_04_He.indd   724 8/19/10   2:08 PM
HE /  T IBET AuTONOMY APPROACH • 725
intended to force the participants to look at the issue from the perspective 
of others. 
To enhance the deliberative capacities of the participants, Baogang He 
suggested three “ladders” for them. The first ladder related to their ability to 
express and reflect each of their views critically. The second ladder required 
the participants to go beyond their own perspectives in search of a diversity 
of opinions. In placing oneself in the position of another, it is important to 
consider whether the views of others are convincing and whether one should 
modify his/her own views as a result. The third ladder involved the synthesis 
of competing views in a systematic manner, in order to develop a balanced 
view on the complexity of the Tibet issue. 
RESuLT AND DISCuSSION
Knowledge Gained
In comparing the results of the first and second surveys, it can be seen that 
both the ethnic Chinese and Tibetan students increased their level of knowl-
edge substantively (see Table 2).44 This knowledge gain might be an indicator 
of improving mutual understanding, which in turn helps to increase the level 
of mutual trust. However, both ethnic Chinese and Tibetan knowledge 
dropped slightly for two questions, which might be accounted for by lapses 
in memory. 
Increased Mutual Trust
Both the ethnic Chinese and Tibetan students increased the level of mutual 
trust, even when discussing the controversial issue of Tibetan autonomy. The 
ethnic Chinese participants were asked whether “most Tibetans are trustwor-
thy” (see Table 3, Q31).
On a scale where 0 is “strongly disagree,” 5 is in the middle, and 10 is 
“strongly agree,” the mean value increased from 4.25 in the first survey before 
44. The questionnaire had six factual questions to test the knowledge level of the participants. 
Question 8 is “In which year did the Dalai Lama propose the Middle Way policy?” Question 9 is 
“Did Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping say that apart from the question of independence, all other 
issues could be discussed and all problems can be resolved?” Question 10 is “Under the Dalai Lama’s 
autonomy proposal, which of the following areas of government would remain the responsibility of 
the central Chinese government?” Questions 11a, b, c are about the range of autonomy rights in 
China’s Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities adopted on May 31, 1984. 
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the deliberation to 6 in the second survey after the deliberation. The mean 
value for the Tibetan respondents on the question of whether “most Chinese 
are trustworthy” (Q33) increased from 4.5 to 6. The mean value for the Tibetan 
respondents improved from 5 to 8 regarding the statement that “most Chi-
nese I have met are trustworthy” (Q35). This closely mirrored the results of 
the deliberative poll in Northern Ireland, as discussed earlier.
When we examined the transcript of the group discussion, it became clear 
that throughout the process, almost all participants expressed a view on the 
importance of trust. What we, the researchers, believe to have been the en-
hancement of mutual trust came through the recognition of the reasonable-
ness of the other party. Anecdotal evidence showed that in the beginning, 
some ethnic Chinese students were angered by the “unbelievably unreason-
able” Tibetan protests over the Beijing Olympics. Likewise, some Tibetans 
felt that that the ethnic Chinese students did not understand the Tibetans’ 
quest for justice and that their actions were intended to deliver a strong mes-
sage to the world. After three days of contact and deliberation, each side 
found the other side equipped with reasoning capacity.
The result was very positive. At the end of the event, each side found that 
the other side had a reasonable argument. With regard to the question of 
whether “most Tibetans are open to reason” (Q30), the mean value of the 
ethnic Chinese respondents increased from 2.67 in the first survey to 6 in the 
second. In contrast, the mean value of the Tibetan respondents increased 
from 4.4 to 6, a rather small indicator of change, on the question of whether 
“most Chinese are open to reason” (Q32). 
table 2. Knowledge Gained (Based on Survey Questions 8–11)
Chinese Tibetans
1st Survey 2nd Survey 1st Survey 2nd Survey
Q8 8.3 50 92.9 85.7
Q9 75 91.7 92.9 85.7
Q10 83.89 78.6 75 92.9
Q11-a 66.7 91.7 64.3 78.6
Q11-b 58.3 91.7 35.7 64.3
Q11-c 66.7 58.3 50 71.4
source: By author.
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table 3. Mean Value of the Surveyed Questions 
Chinese Students Tibetan Students
Before After Before After
Q12 Critics of the Chinese government say that 
China should allow Tibet to have autonomy, 
in order to preserve its traditional culture and 
allow the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. 
(Strongly agree = 0, Strongly disagree = 10)
4.3 4.08 2.8 1.4
Q13 The Chinese government says that Tibet 
has long been part of China, that Tibet has 
benefited from modernization, and that the 
Dalai Lama should not be allowed to return 
because he aims to split Tibet from China. 
(Strongly agree = 0, Strongly disagree = 10)
3.83** 5.83** 8.4 7.57
Q14 Is the Dalai Lama’s autonomy proposal 
sincere? (0 = not at all sincere, 5 = median level, 
10 = most sincere)
5.42 4.75 9.7 10
Q15 Do you believe that the Chinese government 
is serious about the Dalai Lama’s autonomy 
proposals? (Not serious = 0, Serious = 10) 
5.25** 7.08** 1.2 2.29
Q16 Do you believe that the Dalai Lama is 
seeking independence in the guise of autonomy? 
(0 = to seek independence, 5 = median level, 
10 = not to seek independence)
3.92 3.92 9.9 9.3
Q17 Is autonomy the best option for Tibet? 
(0 = the worst, 5 = in the middle, 10 = the best)
6.33 5.8 7.7 7.4
Q18 Is independence the best option for Tibet? 
(0 = the worst, 5 = the middle, 10 = the best)
1.67* 0.3* 6.8 6
Q19 Is the current situation the best option for 
Tibet? (0 = the worst, 5 = in the middle, 
10 = the best)
4.5 3.5 0.4 1
Q20 Should Tibetans be allowed to display photos 
of the Dalai Lama in temples? (0 = strong 
disapproval, 5 = in the middle level, 10 = strong 
approval)
6.5 7.58 10 10
Q21 Should schools in Tibetan areas be 
encouraged to teach Tibetan? (0 = strong 
disapproval, 5 = in the middle, 10 = strong 
approval) 
9.67* 8.5* 10 9.5
Q22 Should schools in Tibetan areas be 
encouraged to teach in Tibetan rather than in 
Mandarin? (0 = strong disapproval, 5 = in the 
middle, 10 = strong approval)
5.58 3.92 9.4* 7.5*
(continued )
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table 3. Mean Value of the Surveyed Questions (Continued) 
Chinese Students Tibetan Students
Before After Before After
Q23 Tibetans don’t understand the Chinese 
perspective on Tibet. (0 = strongly agree, 
5 = in the middle, 10 = strongly disagree)
2.58 3.17 6.6 6
Q24 Westerners don’t understand the Chinese 
perspective on Tibet. (0 = strongly agree, 
5 = in the middle, 10 = strongly disagree)
3.8 2.5 5.9 6
Q25 Chinese don’t understand the Tibetan issue. 
(0 = strongly agree, 5 = in the middle, 
10 = strongly disagree)
5.3 6.33 2.2 2
Q26 Are you pessimistic or optimistic about 
the future of China? (0 = very pessimistic, 
5 = neither pessimistic nor optimistic, 
10 = very optimistic)
8 7.7 6 6
Q27 Are you optimistic or pessimistic about 
the future of Tibet? (0 = very pessimistic, 
5 = in the middle, 10 = very optimistic)
7 6 8.2 7
Q28 Most people in Australia are open to reason. 
(0 = strongly disagree, 5 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 10 = strongly agree)
7.5 6.4 7.6 8
Q29 Most people in Australia are trustworthy. 
(0 = strongly disagree, 5 = in the middle, 
10 = strongly agree)
6.67 7 6 7
Q30 Most Tibetans are open to reason. 0 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = in the middle, 10 = strongly agree)
2.67* 6* 8.7 8.5
Q31 Most Tibetans are trustworthy. (0 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = in the middle, 10 = strongly agree)
4.25** 6** 7.9 9
Q32 Most Chinese are open to reason. (0 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = in the middle, 10 = strongly agree)
5.3 6 4.4* 6*
Q33 Most Chinese are trustworthy. (0 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = in the middle, 10 = strongly agree)
6.7 7 4.5 6
Q34 Most Tibetans I have met are reasonable. 
(0 = strongly disagree, 5 = in the middle, 
10 = strongly agree)
3.75* 7* 10 8
Q35 Most Chinese I have met are trustworthy. 
(0 = strongly disagree, 5 = in the middle, 
10 = strongly agree)
7.5 7 5** 8**
source: By author.
note: “Before” refers to the mean scores of the first survey before deliberation; “After” refers to the 
mean scores of the second survey after deliberation. T-tests of the difference in mean scores on the above 
questions at the two stages showed that while some marked * were significant at the p = 0.07 level, 
others marked ** achieved p scores of 0.15, and many remained unchanged.
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Moderating Effect
The deliberation workshop produced a moderating effect. When two groups 
in a divided society are separated, their emotions are fully charged and they 
see things through a fixed angle without considering the perspectives of oth-
ers. When the ethnic Chinese and Tibetan groups came together in small 
group discussions, however, an immediate moderating effect became appar-
ent. The use of English as the communicative language also promoted mod-
eration because neither group was communicating in its native language. 
Many participants thus were unable to express their anger and emotions eas-
ily (of course, one could also argue that this would have made people sup-
press their feelings). The facilitators played a role in controlling any extreme 
behavior and in encouraging a greater understanding of others. 
One example of the moderating effect was the discussion about compet-
ing interpretations of history. While the Tibetan participants held the view 
that China invaded Tibet and carried out a colonization policy, the ethnic 
Chinese participants clung to the idea that China liberated Tibet from the 
serf system and carried out socialist reform there. These two views possibly, 
but not necessarily, were the product of official indoctrination, and were 
likely to be reinforced if one group had no contact with the other group. 
Consequently, this kind of knowledge was reproduced within an isolated and 
closed environment.
When the two groups were put together to exchange opinions, however, 
members of each recognized alternative views immediately, and the matter 
became much more complex than was originally thought. As a result, five or 
six students did critically examine two interpretations of the disputed history 
and questioned the role of history. When it was recognized that each inter-
pretation contains partial truth, it became more difficult to make a strong 
and exclusive argument. As a result, a compromise was preferred, which 
tends to soften radical political positions. In this way, deliberation was able 
to reduce the level of radicalization and achieve a middle ground. 
Enhanced Deliberative Capacities
The deliberative workshop succeeded in enhancing deliberative capacities. 
Quite a few participants from both sides agreed that a power-sharing mecha-
nism might be a realistic solution to deal with the current predicament. The 
participants were able to develop a diversity of views, considering the perspec-
tives of others and changing their own positions and opinions. For example, 
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there was a convergence on policy issues over the display of religious photo-
graphs and also over the language of school instruction. The participants 
were asked whether Tibetans should be allowed to display photos of the 
Dalai Lama in temples (Q20). Before deliberation, the ethnic Chinese par-
ticipants scored a mean of 6.5. By contrast, the Tibetan participants scored 
the highest possible approval grade of 10. After deliberation, there was a clear 
shift in the approval of the ethnic Chinese participants, with the mean in-
creasing to 7.58. 
With regard to the teaching of Tibetan in schools in Tibetan areas (Q21), 
the mean approval scores for both the ethnic Chinese and Tibetan partici-
pants dropped. While both strongly favored Tibetan being taught in schools 
in Tibetan areas, the scores dropped slightly, from 9.67 to 8.5 for the ethnic 
Chinese and from 10 to 9.5 for the Tibetans. 
Before deliberation, ethnic Chinese participants scored a mean of 6.33 
when asked whether autonomy was the best option for Tibet (Q17); after 
deliberation, the mean score dropped to 5.8. A similar trend emerged when 
considering whether independence was the best option for Tibet (Q18). Ini-
tially, the ethnic Chinese participants recorded a mean score of 1.67 while 
the Tibetan participants scored 6.8. Subsequent to the deliberative work-
shops, the mean scores declined to 0.3 and 6, respectively.
Consensus and Process
The deliberative workshop reached a consensus on a number of issues, in-
cluding the undesirability of using force, the importance of establishing mu-
tual trust, and the necessity of compromise. Several participants said that 
despite the different perspectives, the future can be changed through mutual 
trust and compromise. Interestingly, both sides shared a similar mean value 
on a number of questions: whether they were optimistic about the future of 
China (Q26) and the future of Tibet (Q27), and if they thought that most 
people in Australia were open to reason (Q28) and were trustworthy (Q29).
The participants said that they greatly appreciated the process. When 
asked a series of questions on a 0–10 scale, where 0 indicated “generally a 
waste of time” and 10 meant “extremely valuable,” the participants gave the 
small-group discussions an average rating of 8.88 and the entire three days’ 
deliberation an average rating of 8.31. They also thought the process consid-
ered their views very equally. On a 1–5 scale, where 1 is very equal and 5 is 
very unequal, the average answer for whether the “small group moderator 
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provide[d] everyone with an equal opportunity for discussion” was 1.46, and 
the average for whether the group members were, in fact, equal in the discus-
sion was 2.04. 
THE L IMITS  OF DELIBERATION
Some aspects of deliberative results have fallen short of the ideal of delibera-
tive democracy. Experiments that fail to fully capture this ideal in this forum 
are indicated by the continuation of polarization, the absence of change in 
the value issues, and the continual recitation of official views. With regard to 
a number of main issues such as cultural identity, foreign intervention, and 
autonomy, there is a tendency for the two groups to polarize (see Table 3, 
Q12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, and 22). Although the participants changed 
their opinions on policy and attitude issues between tests 1 and 2, value is-
sues remained largely unchanged.
Tibetan participants insisted that the boundary of Tibetan autonomy 
should include all Tibetan areas, including those located in China outside 
the TAR, while the ethnic Chinese participants thought such a view unreal-
istic and likely to damage China’s unity. The ethnic Chinese participants 
regarded Beijing’s efforts in Tibet as laudable modernization. One partici-
pant expressed the view that minorities should not feel pain about losing 
their cultural identity because Han Chinese cultural identity is also lost daily 
through globalization. By contrast, some Tibetan participants asserted that 
unless the people of China recognize that China occupied Tibet, Tibetans 
will continue to feel patronized. 
No change of opinion among the ethnic Chinese participants was re-
corded on the question of regarding autonomy as a disguise for indepen-
dence. Two reasons account for this. First, the Tibetan participants failed to 
convince the others during small-group discussions with their explanations 
on the involvement of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Tibet.45 
Rather, one Tibetan recounted the story of India’s transition from self-rule 
to independence. This only served to strengthen the view of the ethnic Chi-
nese participants that autonomy is a camouflage for independence. Second, 
the Tibetan participants associated autonomy with independence. This is 
45. The CIA encouraged, trained, and controlled Tibet’s resistance movement. See Kenneth 
Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2002).
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demonstrated by the fact that the questions “Is autonomy the best option for 
Tibet?” (Q17) and “Is independence the best option for Tibet?” (Q18) re-
ceived similar scores: the mean value for the former was 7.7 and for the 
latter, 6.8. 
The deliberative workshop reveals that the nature of the issue itself has an 
impact on the deliberation process and outcome. The national identity issue 
is different from social policy issues. The former is concerned with sover-
eignty and nationalism; the latter is about the preferences, needs, and de-
mands of daily life. Value and identity attitudes are difficult to change 
quickly through deliberation, while social policy preference can be changed 
through public deliberation and consultation. 
Although quite a few participants did move away from the official line, 
some Tibetans and ethnic Chinese continued to repeat the official views. The 
opinions of individuals are sometimes shaped by the communities or social 
positions to which they belong. One ethnic Chinese participant articulated 
this well: “I fully understand and support the principle of self-determination 
from my personal experience of being a Han Chinese, a member of minority 
in Russia, Xinjiang, and Australia, but I will not support the Tibetan cause.”46 
The examination of historical evidence and competing claims proved to 
be difficult. These complicated historical disputes have not been solved by 
historians and scholars after years of research, let alone by Tibetans and eth-
nic Chinese students after one weekend of deliberation. It is unrealistic for 
students to solve all the problems associated with the Tibet issue, and it is 
impractical to expect change in value and full development of deliberative 
capacity within two or three days. The restricted time frame for the work-
shops meant that participants were unable to fully synthesize the intellectual 
arguments. 
The fundamental limitation is the application to nationality conflict issues 
of the deliberative approach, since it is alien in the Chinese context. The 
central government has been the dominating and sole arbiter on nationality 
questions. A pessimist might hold that the nature of authoritarianism is 
hostility toward deliberation and truthfulness; radical Tibetans may see de-
liberation as empty talk.47 
46. The source for this is a note taken by Baogang He. 
47. Lobsang Yeshi of the pro-independence Tibetan Youth Congress complains that Tibetans are 
allowed “talks about talks,” but when they finally explain their position they are condemned. See M. C. 
Davis, “Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet,” Human Rights Quarterly 30:2 (2008), p. 257.
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CONCLuSION
This article has reviewed and compared three deliberative approaches to con-
flict and applied the deliberative approach to the Tibet issue. It examined the 
case of a deliberative workshop on the Tibet issue and highlighted the 
achievements and limits of deliberative conflict resolution mechanisms. De-
liberative dialogue improved knowledge and mutual understanding, en-
hanced mutual trust and deliberative capacities, and produced moderating 
effects. It provided quantitative evidence that Han-Tibetan mistrust can be 
significantly reduced through deliberative discussion and reflective interac-
tion, and offered some potential for repairing a distrusting relationship be-
tween the ethnic Chinese and Tibetan communities. The participants may 
still be locked into a polarized position on independence and sovereignty 
issues, but the level of polarization over social and cultural policies can be 
reduced.
Citizen deliberation would be in the interest of both the Chinese govern-
ment, which needs to develop its soft power and improve its international 
reputation, and the Dalai Lama, who has called for Tibetans to befriend the 
ethnic Chinese to gain more supporters among them. Moreover, local gov-
ernments within China under pressure to heal the social rift have been intro-
ducing a variety of deliberative forums to address local policy issues.48 It is 
evidently possible for the Chinese government to employ more heart-to-
heart forums that would help ease ethnic tension and build a harmonious 
society. 
In addition, citizen-initiated deliberative forums can take place outside 
the existing institutions of the nation-state.49 Small talks with limited num-
bers of people can begin with friendship associations or local communities 
such as those in Australia, Canada, the U.S., and many European countries. 
One dialogue forum in Hong Kong50 has already produced a number of 
48. See Baogang He, “Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China,” in Ethan and He, 
The Search for Deliberative Democracy, pp. 176–96; James Fishkin, Baogang He, Bob Ruskin, and 
Alice Siu, “Deliberative Democracy in an Unlikely Place,” British Journal of Political Science 40:2 
(2010), pp. 435–48.
49. Tashi Rabgey, “Newtibet.com: Citizenship as Agency in a Virtual Tibetan Public,” confer-
ence paper presented at Tibet and Contemporary World, the University of British Columbia, April 
18–20, 2004.
50. I was invited to participate in this dialogue forum organized by the University of Hong 
Kong, July 29–30, 2009. 
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innovative ideas such as a “Tibetan Special Cultural Zone” to address the 
current stalemate. 
Ideally, talks would naturally progress into the Tibetan region itself, where 
the daily practical needs of citizens can be more directly addressed.51 In the 
short term, “irrelevant discussions” are not geared at all toward finding reso-
lutions for complicated issues. Rather, they break down barriers and resent-
ment, encourage mutual understanding, trust, and cooperative behavior, and 
lay the ground work for more official work. Deliberative workshops can 
break down self-closed knowledge production systems while fostering a new 
flexible, critical generation. Deliberations practiced widely in the public 
sphere can give form to new terms and concepts, create discourses favorable 
to resolution, raise public consciousness, and eventually penetrate the politi-
cal sphere, influencing state policy and action in an informal, indirect way.52 
51. With regard to concrete proposals, see Rabgey and Sharlho, “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue,” pp. 
46–47.
52. Dryzek, “Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies.” 
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